A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key finding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.
Introduction
Consider a committee voting to select one of two alternatives. It is known that simple majority voting has good welfare properties in an environment with ordinal preferences (Rae, 1969) . However, simple majority is not capable of expressing preference intensities. This can lead to inecient decisions, the phenomenon that is known as tyranny of majority. This paper focuses on a voting mechanism that we call conclave, in which the committee's decision is determined in a form of a waiting game with costly delay. Theoretical work (Kwiek, 2014a; 2014b) suggests that voting mechanisms that permit penalties, such as waiting costs, may improve welfare over simple majority.
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The aim of the current paper is to explore experimentally voting behavior and welfare performance of a simple type of such voting procedure.
Settings that share features of the voting institution we study in this paper include selecting a candidate by a hiring committee, or reaching a verdict by a trial jury. The procedure by which the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church is elected is perhaps the most tting real-world example, and the inspiration for the name we use. Papal conclaves require a supermajority of 2/3 for the decision, and many periods of voting could pass before the decision is made.
Our study relates to two strands of literature. One investigates voting mechanisms that take intensity of preferences into consideration, with an aim to improve welfare. For instance, Casella (2005) observed that linking many voting problems together may help to incentivize voters.
2 Unlike these previous studies, we focus on one isolated binary decision. Secondly, the game that we study is a type of war of attrition. Hörisch and Kirchkamp (2010) and Oprea et al. (2013) experimentally investigate the benchmark case with two players and independent private information. We study a three-player committee in which two of the players have common interest in favor of one alternative. 3 
The Environment and the Mechanism
We consider a committee of three voters that has to choose between two alternatives. Two voters support one alternative, and the remaining one supports the another one. Committee members have private information about how much they value their preferred alternative.
1 Thus, we follow the classical political economy approach (for example, Rae (1969) and Azrieli and Kim (2014) ), whereby monetary transfers are not allowed. We depart from this literature by introducing waiting costs. 3 See also theoretical studies of Ponsati and Sakovics (1996) and Bulow and Klemperer (1999) .
A voting conclave is a mechanism in which an alternative is selected by voting repeatedly until a sucient supermajority in its favor is reached.
To study a tractable version of a conclave in the lab, we use a form of a waiting game, whereby voters initially support their preferred alternative, but may irreversibly cease supporting it at any time. The alternative that loses support of its last supporter is rejected by the committee, and the other alternative the one that still has positive support is selected. Staying in the game is costly for voters. The waiting cost is determined by a voter's exit time or the time when the waiting game stops. That is, if the exiting voter is not the last one supporting an alternative, then the waiting game continues even after her exit. However, her waiting cost is the monetary value of her actual waiting time, rather than the time when the committee reaches the decision.
The nal payo of a voter whose alternative is selected is her value of the alternative minus her waiting cost; the voter whose alternative is not selected pays her waiting cost.
4
In terms of eciency, we distinguish between two notions of welfare.
Allocative (gross) utilitarian welfare is only concerned with utilities generated by the selected alternative, disregarding the waiting cost. Net welfare subtracts waiting cost from allocative welfare, treating it as social waste. Our second objective is to investigate dierences between the dynamic waiting game described above and its static version. In the static version, agents simply report their intended exit times and then the computer calculates the outcome. The static and the dynamic version of the game are equivalent from the strategic point of view, because voters do not get feedback about the behavior of other voters in either version. However, there is 4 In the experiment we assume a two-point value distribution. A symmetric equilibrium in this case involves mixed strategies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to directly assess whether voting behavior in the experiment is close to equilibrium. 5 Previous theoretical work (Yoon, 2011; Kwiek, 2014a Kwiek, , 2014b suggests that, as the distribution of values becomes more ex ante heterogeneous, conclave should perform better in relation to simple majority voting. Intuitively, eciency is obtained if voters with very extreme values have a signicant inuence on which alternative is selected, not the ones that are almost indierent. More stringent supermajority rule gives them that power.
experimental evidence in the context of a classic two-player war of attrition (Hörisch and Kirchkamp, 2010) , that players are less aggressive in the dynamic version. We, therefore, expect that voters will be more conservative and consequently waiting costs will be smaller in the dynamic version of the conclave.
Experimental Design
In all our treatments, we allow voters to have a two-point value distribution, low or high. We run two treatments of the static version of the game with dierent distributions of private values.
Treatment Static-Low -this is a static treatment with low ex ante heterogeneity of private values. Namely, a voter can be of low value L = 70 with probability 2/3, and of high value H = 160 with probability 1/3.
The mean value is 100.
Treatment Static-High -a static treatment with high heterogeneity. A voter can be of low value L = 20 with probability 2/3, and of high value H = 260 with probability 1/3. The mean value is also 100.
In the dynamic version of the game, we only implement the high heterogeneity case. That is, Treatment Dynamic-High -this is dynamic treatment with high heterogeneity of private values: L = 20 with probability 2/3, and of high value H = 260 with probability 1/3. • Participants are randomly assigned to a three-member committee (and are randomly rematched in every round).
• Each committee member receives a valuation, high or low.
• In a static treatment, the subjects report their intended exit costs (between 0 and 300 EMU). In the dynamic treatment, the subjects face a clock, which measures time from 0 to 60 seconds, and they choose when to exit. Staying in the game costs 5 EMU per second, and hence the costs also varies between 0 and 300 EMU.
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• The computer solves for the selected alternative and the individual waiting costs.
6
In order to avoid negative payos, subjects receive an endowment of 900 EMU at the beginning of a session, and only three periods are randomly selected for calculating the subject's payment. The average payment was ¿16 including a show-up fee of ¿4.
Results
In both static versions of the conclave that we investigate, high valuation voters choose higher exit costs than low valuation voters. In fact, the c.d.f. of exit costs of high valuation voters rst order stochastically dominates that of low valuation voters (see Figure 1) . Note also that in treatment StaticHigh, high valuation voters choose higher exit costs than their counterparts in treatment Static-Low, while low types seem to select similarly in the two treatments. In the Dynamic treatment, we do not always observe the exit times of all voters, as the voting game may end before all voters declared an exit time.
Therefore, instead of individual exit times we present the c.d.f. of the actual 6 In case of a tie, the computer randomly selected one of the alternatives and computed payments accordingly. 7 We can also conrm in unreported regression analysis that exit times are higher for high valuation voters controlling for periods, session and even individual xed eects. We next turn attention to the eciency of the decisions made by committees in the experiment. 
Conclusions
This paper reports results of experiments designed to assess the welfare performance of conclaves in comparison to simple majority voting. As expected, 8 For example, HL-L is a committee in which the majority group has one high value and one low value voter, and the minority has a low value voter. a more stringent supermajority is more ecient than simple majority, if agents are ex ante heterogeneous (Result 1). Our results are also consistent with an experimentally observed anomaly, whereby the dynamic war of attrition induces less aggressive behavior than its static version despite the fact that the two are strategically equivalent (Result 2). In terms of allocative eciency, the dynamic conclave outperforms simple majority (Result 3).
